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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have contracted with Joe's Advertising Agency
to provide marketing services. In the middle of performing the con-
tract, Joe presents you with a bill for the services rendered so far. You
and Joe dispute the manner in which the billing was supposed to be
calculated under the contract. To resolve this problem, you suggest
that you and Joe modify the contract's terms, and discussions of the
specific terms follow. Ultimately, the discussions fail, and Joe initiates
litigation against you to collect on the bill. During litigation, Joe
wants to submit into evidence the contract-modification discussions,
specifically correspondence in which you admit that you did not read
the contract terms carefully. You object to the admission of this evi-
dence, stating that the discussions are protected as statements made
during compromise negotiations under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. It is unclear, however, whether the contract modification
was properly a compromise negotiation' under Rule 408 or merely a
business discussion to modify the terms of a contract. 2
Rule 408 excludes evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations.3 Rule 408's protection of conduct and
statements made in compromise negotiations falls along two dimen-
sions. First, Rule 408 does not protect conduct and statements made
in compromise negotiations when they are used to "prov[e] a wit-
ness's bias or prejudice, negat[e] a contention of undue delay, or
prov[e] an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution."4
1 In this Note, I use the term "compromise negotiation" to refer only to the technical
term in Rule 408. I use "negotiation" to refer generally to the broader notion of negotia-
tion in ordinary speech.
2 For a closer analysis of this example, see infra Part I.B.
3 The amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408(a), effective December 1, 2011, states:
Evidence of the following is not admissible-on behalf of any party-either
to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to im-
peach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:
(1) furnishing, promising, or offering-or accepting, promising to ac-
cept, or offering to accept-a valuable consideration in compromising
or attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations
about the claim-except when offered in a criminal case and when the
negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.
FED. R. Evm. 408(a). Note that even if evidence may be inadmissible at trial, it may never-
theless be discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hallmark v. Cohen &
Slamowitz, LLP, 283 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (W.D.N.Y. 2012); Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, "Wells
Submissions" to the SEC as Offers of Settlement Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Their Protec-
tion From Third-Party Discovery, 102 COLUm. L. REv. 1912, 1938 (2002).
4 FED. R. EvIm. 408(b). The rule's wording, however, suggests that the purposes out-
lined in the rule are not exhaustive. See id. ("The court may admit this evidence for an-
other purpose, such as proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution." (em-
phasis added)). Furthermore, the wording of the rule before the 2011 amendment explic-
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Instead, Rule 408's prohibition applies to the use of settlement evi-
dence to "prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim
or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction."5
Thus, along this dimension, the scope of Rule 408's protection refers
to the purposes for which a party introduces evidence of conduct and
statements made in compromise negotiations. Second, Rule 408's
protection extends only to certain kinds of evidence: conduct and
statements made in compromise negotiations.6 This Note focuses on is-
sues concerning the second dimension of Rule 408's scope, as illus-
trated in the example above.
Determining when compromise negotiations have begun is the
crux of identifying the scope of Rule 408's protection. This issue is
pressing not only because attorneys rely on courts' interpretations of
when Rule 408 operates in resolving disputes and advising their cli-
ents7 but also because it affects how state courts protect compromise
negotiations. Although Rule 408 only applies to federal courts, many
states have modeled their rules of evidence on the Federal Rules of
itly specified that the purposes provided in the rule were not exhaustive. FED. R. EVID.
408(2) (1975) (amended 2011) ("This rule ... does not require exclusion when the evi-
dence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, nega-
tving a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution.").
5 FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
6 See id. Rule 408 also provides an exception in criminal cases. See id. R. 408(a) (2)
("Evidence of ... conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the
claim [is admissible] . .. when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related
to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
authority."). This exception does not fall squarely into the two-dimensional analysis of
Rule 408's scope. Rather, the exception looks at the party offering the evidence. Thus, the
party offering the evidence can add a third dimension to the analysis of Rule 408's scope.
This dimension of the analysis also looks to the relationship between the party offering the
evidence and the parties involved in the compromise negotiation, taking into account, for
instance, the fact that the plaintiff attempts to offer evidence of compromise negotiations
involving the defendant and third parties. For a discussion of compromise negotiations
involving third parties, see Chad Albert, Comment, Racing to Settlement: The Applicability of
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to Nonparty Settlement Communications, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1199,
1218 (2010).
7 See Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTiNGS
L.J. 955, 965 (1988) ("To maximize the odds that communications will be protected by
rule 408, an attorney should either (1) file suit before beginning negotiations (a move
[that] may not be conducive to constructive discussions) or (2) announce, as a preface to
communications, that he is invoking the protections of rule 408, that communications al-
ready completed between the parties establish that they have a dispute, that his client fears
the dispute could lead to litigation, and that the purpose of his communication is to pre-
sent an offer of compromise and to contribute to negotiations looking toward a settlement
agreement."); Albert, supra note 6, at 1204 ("There has been a wealth of scholarship con-
cerning the types of settlement communications covered by the Rule and the safeguards
that parties must employ in order to ensure the Rule's applicability to the precise circum-
stances of their litigation."); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1009, 1035 (1999) ("Often an offender will want to apologize immediately after the
injury; however, F.R.E. 408 may not cover such an apology.").
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Evidence.8 Currently, the federal circuit courts have created various
tests to determine when compromise negotiations begin, and these
tests do not provide consistent guidance.9 The resulting circuit split
compounds the problem for attorneys advising their clients in resolv-
ing disputes.
Beginning with the historical background of Rule 408 and an
analysis of its two policy rationales (public policy and relevancy), Part I
of this Note provides a more detailed explanation of the problem of
determining when compromise negotiations begin and so trigger
Rule 408's protection. Part II details the circuit split in determining
when compromise negotiations begin, outlining the various tests that
the circuit courts have fashioned. Part III provides an overview of how
the issue extends to state courts. Part IV discusses the conceptual
problem concerning the way the circuit courts have approached the
issue of determining when compromise negotiations begin. It starts
with an analysis of why the public policy rationale of promoting the
settlement of disputes has been the "more consistently impressive
ground"'0 for the protection of compromise negotiations. Part IV
then argues that the public policy rationale provides little to no gui-
dance for determining when compromise negotiations begin and
that, contrary to present practice, courts should not look to the public
policy rationale in deciding the threshold question of when compro-
mise negotiations begin. Instead, the relevancy rationale should pro-
vide guidance in determining the boundaries of a compromise
negotiation under Rule 408. Specifically, Part IV argues that courts
should utilize a multifactor approach rather than the current vague
standards to determine when a compromise negotiation begins.
I
FEDERAL RuLE OF EVIDENCE 408
A. Historical Background and Policy Rationales
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,11
federal courts afforded limited protection to compromise negotia-
tions.12 The common law rule only protected evidence involving an
8 See, e.g., IDAHo R. Evio. 408; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4547 (CONSOL. 2011); see also Soria v.
Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 726 P.2d 706, 728 (Idaho 1986) (stating that the court had previ-
ously relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 408 in the application of Rule 408 of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence).
9 See infra Part II.
10 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
11 Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app.
(2011)).
12 See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARr A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 408.05[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2012); Brazil, supra note 7, at 957 ("Federal
courts had afforded an uneven and limited protection to settlement proposals prior to the
1000 [Vol. 98:997
THE DISPUTE THRESHOLD
actual settlement offer, and admissions of fact made during attempts
to settle were admissible unless they were hypothetical, expressly
made "'without prejudice,' or so connected with the offer as to be
inseparable from it."" Under the common law protection of compro-
mise negotiations, there were two principal policy rationales for pro-
tecting settlement offers: lack of relevancy and the promotion of
settlements.1 4 First, evidence of offers to compromise is irrelevant be-
cause those offers may be based on a desire to resolve the dispute or
terminate litigation rather than a concession of liability.' 5 Such evi-
dence "could not support any reliable inference about the merits of
the claim or the amount of damages." 16 Second, excluding evidence
of offers or demands to settle promotes the public policy of encourag-
ing settlement. Knowing that an offer to settle a dispute will be inad-
missible at trial, parties will be more willing to begin compromise
negotiations. 17
The common law protection of compromise evidence relied
more heavily upon the relevancy rationale than the public policy ratio-
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975."); see, e.g., Hiram Ricker & Sons v.
Students Int'l Meditation Soc'y, 501 F.2d 550, 553 (1st Cir. 1974) ("It is, of course, true that
evidence of settlement negotiations is generally inadmissible. On the other hand, there is
a 'well-recognized exception regarding admissions of fact as distinguished from hypotheti-
cal or provisional concessions conditioned upon the settlement's completion.'" (quoting
NLRB v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 406 F.2d 1306, 1313 (1st Cir. 1969))).
13 FED. R. Evio. 408 advisory committee's note (quoting CHARLEs T. McCoRMicK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 251, at 540-41 (1954)).
14 Hiram Richer, 501 F.2d at 553 ("The rule excluding offers of settlement is designed
to encourage settlement negotiations after a controversy has actually arisen. It also pre-
vents admission of evidence that does not represent either party's true belief as to the
facts."). One scholar has suggested that there are five reasons for protecting offers in
compromise:
(1) such offers are irrelevant since they do not imply belief in the validity
of the adversary's position,
(2) parties to a compromise negotiation may by express or implied con-
tract agree that admissions made therein shall be excluded from evidence
and courts will enforce the secrecy agreement,
(3) offers of compromise are excluded because the offeror does not intend
to make an admission,
(4) it is only fair play to exclude the unsuccessful efforts at compromise so
as to prevent them from being turned upon one of the parties,
(5) offers of compromise are privileged communications since the law fa-
vors the settlement of differences without resort to litigation."
George M. Bell, Admissions Arising Out of Compromise-Are They Irrelevant?, 31 TEX. L. REV.
239, 240-41 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
15 See Valerie S. Alabanza, Comment, When Are Settlement Communications Protected as
"Offers to Compromise" Under Rule 408?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547, 550 (2000).
16 Brazil, supra note 7, at 958 (citing 23 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRA-
HAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5302 (1980); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in
Mediation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 441, 447 (1984)).
17 See Edward Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 286 F.2d 933, 938-39 (5th Cir.
1961) ("The law favors settlements. A man will hesitate to discuss a settlement if he thinks
his words or willingness to settle will be turned against him."); Alabanza, supra note 15, at
550-51.
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nale of encouraging settlements.' 8 However, the courts had difficulty
applying the relevancy rationale in determining whether to exclude
offers of compromise.' 9 In applying the relevancy rationale, courts
had to determine the motivation of a party's communication before
ruling on its admissibility; however, at the pretrial stage and early
stages of trial, assessing the motivations of a party's communication is
often difficult.2 0 Thus, most courts limited the common law doc-
trine's protection to "hypothetical or provisional concessions condi-
tioned upon the settlement's completion,"21 statements accompanied
by the words "without prejudice," and statements "so connected with
the offer as to be inseparable from it."22
With the adoption of Rule 408, the Advisory Committee, which
drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, moved away from the relevancy
rationale in favor of the public policy rationale of encouraging settle-
ments.2 3 The public policy rationale "recognized that it was in the
public interest, and in the interest of individual litigants, to encourage
consensual resolution of disputes."24 To promote this public policy,
the Committee expanded the scope of Rule 408's protection beyond
the common law doctrine, which merely protected offers of compro-
mise, to all conduct and statements made during compromise negoti-
18 See 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1061(c) (James
H. Chadbourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1972) (1940); Brazil, supra note 7, at 957-58; Kris-
tina M. Kerwin, Note, The Discoverability of Settlement and ADR Communications: Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 and Beyond, 12 REv. LITIG. 665, 667-68 (1993).
19 See Brazil, supra note 7, at 958.
20 See Alabanza, supra note 15, at 550 (citing 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 12,§ 408.05[ ]) (stating that the common law rule for excluding offers of compromise "re-
sult[ed] in a degree of arbitrariness").
21 NLRB v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 406 F.2d 1306, 1313 (1st Cir. 1969); see also Hiram
Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Meditation Soc'y, 501 F.2d 550, 553 (1st Cir. 1974) (al-
lowing notes with calculations of amounts owed in breach of contract dispute to be admit-
ted into evidence).
22 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 13,
§ 251, at 540-41); see also Cooper v. Brown, 126 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1942) ("[A] distinct
admission of a fact will not be summarily excluded simply because it was made in connec-
tion with an effort to compromise."); Nau v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 362, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1958)
(citing Cooper). This approach was superseded by Rule 408. See Eid v. Saint-Gobain Abra-
sives, Inc., 377 F. App'x 438, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2010).
23 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note ("[A] more consistently impressive
ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of dis-
putes." (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 13, §§ 76, 251)).
24 Brazil, supra note 7, at 958; see also Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use
and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 290
(1999) ("The expense, risk, and delay that frequently attend formal adjudication in the
American legal system explain, at least in part, the party preference for and rising inci-
dence of settlement. . . . This public policy appears deeply embedded in, and actively
encouraged by, our civil justice system, which has, as its primary objective, 'thejust, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.'" (footnotes omitted) (quoting FED. R. Crv.
P. 1)).
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ations.25  The rationale was that the free exchange of information
would facilitate the settlement of disputes.26
B. The Problem of Determining When Compromise
Negotiations Begin
Triggering Rule 408 depends in part on determining whether the
conduct or statements at issue are part of compromise negotiations.27
This determination is simple when the parties have begun litigation.28
However, when parties have not begun litigation, determining when
compromise negotiations begin can often be problematic.29 Consider
the following example: Party A contracts with Party B for certain ser-
vices. In the middle of performing the contract, both parties dispute
how Party B should calculate the bill under the contract. Party A then
sends an e-mail to Party B, stating that if the parties cannot come to an
agreement within a week, Party A will initiate litigation. The parties
attempt to resolve their dispute but eventually move on to litigation.
Whether this e-mail and any other conduct or communications be-
tween the parties aimed at resolving their dispute are part of a com-
promise negotiation-and therefore within Rule 408's protection-is
unclear.s0
A more problematic scenario follows the example above. Instead
of sending an e-mail to Party B to threaten litigation, Party A suggests
25 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note ("The practical value of the common
law rule has been greatly diminished by its inapplicability to admissions of fact, even
though made in the course of compromise negotiations, unless hypothetical, stated to be
'without prejudice,' or so connected with the offer as to be inseparable from it. An inevita-
ble effect is to inhibit freedom of communication with respect to compromise, even among
lawyers.... These considerations account for the expansion of the rule herewith to in-
clude evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations, as well as the
offer or completed compromise itself." (citation omitted)); see 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 12, § 408.05[1]; Alabanza, supra note 15, at 548.
26 See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (stating that the common law doc-
trine "inhibitled] freedom of communication with respect to compromise"). But see Lynne
H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties with Their Statements During Negotiation: Demysticizing the
Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation-Privilege Statutes, 75 WAsH. L.
REv. 1037, 1068 (2000) ("[T]here is no empirical evidence to support the public policy
rationale . . . . For example, the author is unaware of any studies to suggest that the
enactment of Rule 408 ... led to an increase in the amount of negotiated settlements."
(footnotes omitted)).
27 See FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
28 See Pierce v. F.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820, 827 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[W]here a party
is represented by counsel, threatens litigation and has initiated the first administrative
steps in that litigation, any offer made between attorneys will be presumed to be an offer
within the scope of Rule 408."). But see Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F.
Supp. 161, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[L]itigation need not have actually commenced for Rule
408 to apply.").
29 See2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 12, § 408App.01[3], at 408App.-5 ("[I]t is not
always easy to tell when compromise negotiations begin, and informal dealings end.").
30 See infra Part II.
2013] 1003
CORNELL LAW RVIEW [
that the parties modify the contract's terms. The parties discuss vari-
ous formulations of the billing terms, but they are unable to come to
an agreement and eventually move on to litigation. During litigation,
Party A wants to submit into evidence the contract-modification dis-
cussions. The difficulty this scenario presents is determining the line
that separates when the parties merely are attempting to modify the
contract and when the parties enter into the kind of negotiations that
fall under Rule 408's protection.31
The scope of Rule 408's protection with respect to compromise
negotiations raises two issues. On the one hand, the determination of
when compromise negotiations begin presents a problem for counsel
regarding how they advise clients. 3 2 Should counsel for Party B have
declined to discuss modifying the terms of the contract with Party A?
Party B certainly could have announced that any discussion would be
protected under Rule 408 should the dispute lead to litigation. How-
ever, this option is not always viable because it "risks damaging the
prospects for creating the kind of feelings between the parties that are
most conducive to reaching agreement."33 Thus, in crafting a method
to delineate between negotiations that society as a matter of public
policy wants to promote and all other kinds of conduct and state-
ments, that method's effect on the conduct of parties in the future
and whether it will create disincentives for parties to attempt compro-
mise negotiations must be taken into account. On the other hand,
this determination poses a challenge to the courts in fashioning a
principled way to delineate the bounds of compromise negotiations
that will avoid the kind of arbitrariness and administrative difficulty
that the common law rule presented.34
31 See infra Part II.A.1.
32 See Brazil, supra note 7, at 961-62 ("Counsel also must beware of courts making a
distinction between mere business communications, which are not entitled to protection,
and 'offers of compromise,' which are." (citing Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 F.
Supp. 445, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)); Cohen, supra note 7, at 1035-36. Compounding this
problem is the fact that a circuit court will only overturn a district court's decision to admit
evidence if the circuit court finds an abuse of discretion. Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644
F.2d 1097, 1107 (5th Cir. 1981); Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1074
(5th Cir. 1976)).
33 Brazil, supra note 7, at 965.
34 See Alabanza, supra note 15, at 550 ("The common law rule was difficult to apply,
resulting in a degree of arbitrariness, because it required the court to determine the moti-
vation of the party's communication before ruling on its admissibility." (citing 2 WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 12, § 408.05[1], at 408-21 to -22)); Bell, supra note 14, at 239 (stating
that under the common law rule, courts disagree on why they receive or exclude settle-
ment evidence and that the "current decisions still indicate confusion and misunderstand-
ing by courts in their handling of this evidence problem").
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II
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Rule 408's language and the Advisory Committee's note provide
some guidance for determining when compromise negotiations be-
gin. To trigger its exception, the rule requires an actual dispute re-
garding the validity or the amount of a claim.3 5 If, for example, both
parties accept the validity and amount of a debt, then Rule 408 would
not protect any negotiations that follow. The Advisory Committee's
note states: "The policy considerations which underlie the rule do not
come into play when the effort is to induce a creditor to settle an
admittedly due amount for a lesser sum. Hence the rule requires that
the claim be disputed as to either validity or amount."36 However, the
requirement of a dispute merely shifts the problem from determining
when compromise negotiations begin to determining when a dispute
begins. The federal courts have yet to develop a consistent approach
to this issue, resulting in the current circuit split, and the Supreme
Court has yet to address the issue.37
A. The Two Extremes
1. The Tenth Circuit
In Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted the narrowest inter-
pretation of "dispute,"38 requiring that discussions "crystallize[ ] to
the point of threatened litigation" for Rule 408 to apply.3 9 In this
case, Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. (Big 0) claimed that The Goodyear Tire
3 See FED, R. EVID. 408 ("Evidence of the following is not admissible-on behalf of
any party-either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim . . . .").
Note that negotiations following an admission of either the validity or amount of a claim,
but not both, would still fall under Rule 408's protection. Id. Rule 408 does not, however,
protect negotiations regarding illegal acts or conspiracies. Id. R. 408(a) (2); see also 23
WRIGHT & GRaHAM, supra note 16, § 5314, at 282 ("Rule 408 is ... inapplicable when the
claim is based upon some wrong that was committed in the course of the settlement discus-
sions; e.g., libel, assault, breach of contract, unfair labor practice, and the like.... Rule
408 does not prevent the plaintiff from proving his case; wrongful acts are not shielded
because they took place during compromise negotiations." (footnotes omitted)).
36 FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
3 See Constar Int'l, Inc. v. Ball Plastic Container Corp., No. 05-C-669-C, 2006 WIL
6021150, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2006) ("Courts are all over the map on how to apply
Rule 408.").
38 One case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggests that Rule
408 is triggered only when a lawsuit is already filed. See United States v. Hooper, 596 F.2d
219, 225 (7th Cir. 1979); Brazil, supra note 7, at 963. However, this case was not decided in
context of Rule 408; it merely used the same language of "offer in compromise." Hooper,
596 F.2d at 225.
39 561 F.2d 1365, 1373 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Arnold Oil Props., L.L.C. v. Schlum-
berger Tech. Corp., No. CIV-08-1361-D, 2010 WL 3604094, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 2010)
(applying the same rule).
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& Rubber Co. (Goodyear) violated its trademark, "Bigfoot."40 Before
litigation began, Goodyear informed Big 0 of its use of "Bigfoot" in its
advertising campaign and asked Big 0 for a letter indicating that Big
0 had no objection to Goodyear's use of "Bigfoot.""' Big 0 refused
and asked Goodyear to cease using the term "Bigfoot" in its advertis-
ing campaign.42 Goodyear responded by declaring that it intended to
use "Bigfoot" as long as it continued to be a helpful advertising device
and that "if Big 0 did sue, the case would be in litigation long enough
that Goodyear might obtain all the benefits it desired from the term
'Bigfoot.'"43
At trial, Big 0 sought to introduce the communications between
Big 0 and Goodyear. The trial court determined that "communica-
tions between Big 0 and Goodyear representatives ... were not offers
to compromise a dispute.. . . [T] hey were simply business communi-
cations and were relevant and material to show knowledge, willful in-
fringement, and misconduct by Goodyear."44 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling, stating that "the court did not
commit manifest error" in ruling that the disputed statements were
"business communications and not compromise negotiations." 4 5
Without further explanation, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "[t] he
discussions had not crystallized to the point of threatened litigation, a
clear cut-off point."4 6
2. The Third Circuit
While the Tenth Circuit adheres to the narrowest interpretation
of "dispute," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted
the broadest interpretation, requiring merely "a clear difference of
opinion between the parties."47 In Affiliated Manufacturers, Inc. v. Alu-
minum Co. of America, the district court declined to follow the Tenth
Circuit's approach in Big O*48 The district court explained that the
Tenth Circuit's approach "was too restrictive in its establishment of
'the point of threatened litigation [as] a clear cut-off point' for appli-
cation."49 The court instead adopted the approach of Alpex Computer
40 Big 0, 561 F.2d at 1368.
41 Id
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1372.
45 Id. at 1373.
46 Id. One source suggests that "the judges may have been motivated by a desire to
punish the defendant for its 'strong-arm' negotiating tactics." Brazil, supra note 7, at 962
(citing 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 16, § 5306, at 214).
47 Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 528 (3d Cir. 1995).
48 See id. at 526-27.
49 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Big 0, 561 F.2d at 1373).
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Corp. v. Nintendo Co., which "considered factors apart from any indicia
of threatened litigation."50
The Third Circuit held that Alpex rejected the strict standard of
Big O.51 The Third Circuit stated: "Rather, Alpex and other courts
make clear that the Rule 408 exclusion applies where an actual dis-
pute or a difference of opinion exists, rather than when discussions
crystallize to the point of threatened litigation."52 The court reasoned
that because of the standard of review, Big 0 was "not entirely clear
[on] how the Tenth Circuit would view exclusion, rather than inclu-
sion, of negotiations made prior to 'the point of threatened litiga-
tion." 5 3 In concluding, the Third Circuit stated that the meaning of
"dispute" in Rule 408 "includes both litigation and less formal stages
of a dispute."54
B. The Middle Ground
1. The Fzfth Circuit
In Ramada Development Co. v. Rauch, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that Rule 408's scope extends to statements and
conduct "intended to be part of the negotiations toward compro-
mise."5 5 The court, however, did not directly address the "dispute"
language of the rule but rather generally discussed the rule's scope.56
In Ramada, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of con-
tract, seeking damages for the construction of a motel.57 The defen-
dant sought to introduce a report created by the plaintiffs architect
one year before litigation began.58 The court held that Rule 408
"does not indicate that there must be a pre-trial understanding or
agreement between the parties regarding the nature of the report."59
It reasoned that requiring such an understanding or agreement would
undercut the rule's underlying public policy rationale and return it to
the common law doctrine, which required that a party assert that the
50 Id. at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Alpex Computer Corp. v.
Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
51 Affiliated Mfrs., 56 F.3d at 527.
52 Id.
5s Id. The circuit court could only determine whether the district court abused its
discretion in making its evidentiary ruling. Thus, the circuit court's holding did not pur-
port to determine the outer bounds of a dispute under Rule 408. Id.
54 Id. at 528.
55 644 F.2d 1097, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN's EVIDENCE 408[03], at 408-20 to -21 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also
adopted the Fifth Circuit's intent-based test. Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Grp., 916 F.2d
637, 641-42 (11th Cir. 1990).
56 See Ramada, 644 F.2d at 1106.
57 Id. at 1099-101.
58 Id. at 1106.
59 Id. at 1107.
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statement is made "without prejudice."60 Thus, the court excluded
the report under Rule 408.
2. The Seventh Circuit
In S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 408 applied
"only when a claim is rejected at the initial or some subsequent
level."61 In this case, Milwaukee's sewage authority and S.A. Healy Co.
(Healy) had entered into a construction contract.62 Healy encoun-
tered unexpected difficulties in the construction, which increased the
cost, and it sought to adjust the contract price.63 The sewage author-
ity refused, and Healy sued for breach of contract.64
During trial, Healy admitted evidence of a statement by the sew-
age authority's engineer that indicated that Healy's claim for a price
adjustment probably had merit.65 On appeal, the sewage authority
argued that under the contract's claims clause, which required that
"all claims by the Contractor arising from interpretation of or per-
formance under the Contract Documents" be submitted to the engi-
neer, a "claim" implied a dispute.66 The Seventh Circuit disagreed
and stated: "A dispute arises only when a claim is rejected at the initial
or some subsequent level."67 The court thus held that Rule 408 was
not applicable because there was no dispute.68
III
A STATE-COURT PROBLEM
Because many states have modeled their evidence rules on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the problem of determining when compro-
mise negotiations begin is also present in the state-court context.69
Some state courts have looked to the federal courts in fashioning their
own approaches. For example, Arizona initially seemed to adopt a
version of the Seventh Circuit's approach, only to reject it later.70 In
Hernandez v. State, Michael Hernandez fell and injured himself while
visiting a state park and filed a notice of claim with the State of Ari-
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 50 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 1995).
62 Id. at 478.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 478-79.
65 Id. at 480.
66 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
67 Id.
68 Id. (citing Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 830 F.2d 716, 724 n.12
(7th Cir. 1987); In re B.D. Int'l Disc. Corp., 701 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.5 (2d Cir. 1983)).
69 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
70 See Hernandez v. State (Hernandez 1), 35 P.3d 97, 100-01 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001),
vacated, 52 P.3d 765 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc).
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zona claiming negligence.71 The notice described the circumstances
of Hernandez's fall and the amount he claimed for his injuries.72 Al
ter filing the notice of claim, Hernandez brought a civil action against
the State, and the State sought to introduce portions of Hernandez's
notice of claim to impeach Hernandez's credibility. 3 The trial court
admitted the notice of claim.74
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to admit
the notice of claim into evidence.75 The court of appeals explained
that "because there is no 'disputed' claim when the claimant first files
the notice of claim, the notice of claim cannot operate as an offer to
'compromise' a disputed claim, the second characteristic of excluda-
ble evidence under" Rule 408.76 The court elaborated that Rule 408
did not apply because the State had not yet disputed any aspect of the
claim.77
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona vacated the court of
appeals's decision but held for other reasons that the trial court prop-
erly admitted the notice of claim into evidence.78 In the decision, the
court assumed that a notice of claim constituted an offer to compro-
mise under Rule 408.79 It then held that admitting the notice of claim
for the purpose of impeaching Hernandez would promote candor
during settlement negotiations.80 Thus, the state supreme court effec-
tively rejected the court of appeals's test, yet it did not offer a substi-
tute. Instead, the court's decision seems limited to the use of
statements and conduct during compromise negotiations for im-
peachment purposes.8'
Judge Joseph W. Howard wrote a forceful dissent, arguing that
the court should have determined first whether a notice of claim con-
stitutes an offer to compromise.82 Judge Howard argued that the
court of appeals's approach, which required a party to take a contrary
71 Hernandez v. State (Hernandez Il), 52 P.3d 765, 766 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 767.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Hernandez I, 35 P.3d at 100.
77 Id.
78 Hernandez II, 52 P.3d at 769.
79 Id. at 767.
80 Id. at 768.
81 See Ryan v. S.F. Peaks Trucking Co., 262 P.3d 863, 868 n.8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011);
State v. Chisholm, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2005-0176, 2 CA-CR 2005-0208, 2007 WL 5578372, 1[ 33, at
*7 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2007) ("Our supreme court has held the rule does not prohibit
evidence offered to impeach a party's credibility, in part because the rule's purpose is to
foster candor between the parties during settlement negotiations." (citing Hernandez II, 52
P.3d at 768)). For an analysis of the effects of the Hernandez II decision, see Keith A.
Swisher, Note, The Limits of Rule 408 After Hernandez, 35 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 1437 (2003).
82 See Hernandez II, 52 P.3d at 770 (Howard, J., dissenting).
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position, was "too narrow and overly restricts the policy underlying the
rule."83 Instead, Judge Howard adopted the Affiliated Manufacturers
approach, which emphasized the "apparent difference of opinion be-
tween the parties."84 The dissent, however, did not explain how this
approach would further Rule 408's goals.
At least one state, North Dakota, has adopted the Affiliated Manu-
facturers approach.85 In Schlossman & Gunkelman, Inc. v. Tallman, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that under its version of Federal
Rule of Evidence 408, a claim is disputed "if there is a difference in
interests or views which the parties are attempting to resolve through
compromise negotiations or offers to settle."8 6 To determine whether
there was a difference in interests or views, the court adopted the
Ramada intent test.87 The court stated: "Under [Federal Rule of Evi-
dence] 408, the parties' intent controls whether there is a difference
in interests or views which the parties are attempting to resolve
through an offer to settle."88 However, Ramada never specifically ad-
dressed the "dispute" language of Rule 408.89 Rather, in Ramada,
compromise negotiations were underway when the plaintiffs architect
created the report that the defendant sought to introduce into evi-
dence.90 The issue before the court was whether the report was part
of the compromise negotiations and not whether compromise negoti-
ations had begun.91
Thus, given the dearth of state-court cases addressing the scope
of the state's equivalent of Rule 408 and state courts' reliance on fed-
eral precedent, the difficulty in applying Rule 408 is perhaps more
evident in the state-court context. Some state courts, such as the Su-
preme Court of North Dakota, have taken the route of mixing and
matching various aspects of the different federal approaches. Other
courts, such as the Supreme Court of Arizona, have left the issue
unaddressed.92 For example, Idaho state courts have confined analy-
sis of Idaho's version of Rule 408 to identifying a party's purpose for
admitting the evidence, ignoring the issue of when compromise nego-
83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 528 (3d Cir.
1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85 See Schlossman & Gunkelman, Inc. v. Tallman, 593 N.W.2d 374, 378-79 (N.D.
1999).
86 Id. at 378 (citing Affiliated Mfrs., 56 F.3d at 526).
87 Id. at 378-79.
88 Id. at 379 (citing Kritikos v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 821 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir.
1987); Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981)).
89 See Ramada, 644 F.2d at 1106-07.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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tiations begin.9 3 And at least one state has specifically rejected the
federal approach: the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the Affili-
ated Manufacturers difference-of-opinion test and fashioned its own ap-
proach, requiring an "actual controversy."9 4 But requiring an actual
controversy does not do any better to clear the confusion; it merely
narrows the scope of Minnesota's equivalent of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 408.95
IV
THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM
A. Begging the Question with the Public Policy Rationale96
A survey of federal case law shows the varying approaches the fed-
eral courts take to determine when a dispute begins such that it trig-
gers Rule 408.97 The same variety of approach also arises in the state-
court context.98 In determining when a dispute begins, courts have
largely relied on the public policy rationale of promoting settlement
of disputes.99 But perhaps one reason for the varying approaches to
the question of when a dispute begins is that the public policy ratio-
nale itself provides no guidance for courts to craft a consistent ap-
proach. Rather, the public policy rationale requires courts to
determine when a dispute begins before they can apply the rationale.
To understand this argument, this Part examines the public policy ra-
tionale for Rule 408 more closely.
93 See, e.g., Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Nw., 606 P.2d 944, 949-50 (Idaho 1980)
(assuming that a letter from a party's attorney was part of a settlement negotiation), over-
ruled on other grounds by Brown v. Fritz, 699 P.2d 1371, 1373-74 (Idaho 1985).
94 C.J. Duffey Paper Co. v. Reger, 588 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) ("The
Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has taken a narrower view and has stated that an
'actual controversy' must exist at the time of the alleged offer, thus suggesting that the
offer itself cannot be the mechanism that creates the dispute." (citing In re Commodore
Hotel Fire & Explosion Cases, 324 N.W.2d 245, 247-48 (Minn. 1982))).
95 See id.
96 The term "begging the question" is often used to mean "raises the question."
William Safire, Take My Question-Please!, N.Y. TIMES MAc., July 26, 1998, at 10. However, I
use the term "begging the question" in its technical sense of meaning a logically invalid
form of argument that uses the conclusion as the premise for that conclusion. See
ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYics B15, at 89-90 (Robin Smith trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1989)
(c. 384-322 B.C.E.); Safire, supra.
97 See supra Part II.
98 See supra Part III.
9 See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 224 P.3d 1068,
1084 (Idaho 2009) (holding that, in ascertaining the purpose for which a party wants to
admit evidence, courts should give Rule 408 a broad interpretation "in order to encourage
settlement negotiations").
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1. A "More Consistently Impressive Ground"
In adopting Rule 408 in 1975, the Advisory Committee stated that
the "more consistently impressive ground" for the Rule was to pro-
mote settlements, but the Committee gave little indication in its notes
as to why this rationale was "more consistently impressive" than the
relevancy rationale. 00 The congressional reports discussing the en-
actment of the Federal Rules of Evidence are also of little help, in-
stead only demonstrating Congress's hesitance in enacting Rule 408.
More specifically, Congress feared that the rule could become a safe
harbor for hiding evidence: a party could present certain evidence
during settlement negotiations even if it did not relate to the settle-
ment negotiations. 101
The courts have developed their own explanation for why the Ad-
visory Committee preferred the public policy rationale to the rele-
vancy rationale: promoting judicial efficiency through settlement.
Shortly after Congress adopted Rule 408, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Minnesota in United States v. Reserve Mining Co. ex-
plained: "The purpose for the privilege surrounding offers of compro-
mise is to encourage free and frank discussion with a view toward
settling the dispute."102 Other courts have suggested that in promot-
ing the settlement of disputes without a trial, the parties come to a
100 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee's note does
indicate that the purpose of Rule 408 was to cure the effect of the common law rule that
"inhibitted] freedom of communication with respect to compromise." Id. But this state-
ment does not explain why the public policy rationale is "more consistently impressive."
Rather, it merely suggests the means of putting the public policy rationale into effect.
101 See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8 (1973) ("For one thing, it is not always easy to tell
when compromise negotiations begin, and informal dealings end. Also, parties dealing
with government agencies would be reluctant to furnish factual information at preliminary
meetings; they would wait until 'compromise negotiations' began and thus hopefully effect
an immunity for themselves with respect to the evidence supplied. In light of these consid-
erations, the Committee recast the Rule so that admissions of liability or opinions given
during compromise negotiations continue inadmissible, but evidence of unqualified fac-
tual assertions is admissible. The latter aspect of the Rule is drafted, however, so as to
preserve other possible objections to the introduction of such evidence. The Committee
intends no modification of current law whereby a party may protect himself from future
use of his statements by couching them in hypothetical conditional form."); S. REP. No. 93-
1277, at 8 (1974), riprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057 ("[T]he committee has deleted
the House amendment and restored the rule to the version submitted by the Supreme
Court with one additional amendment. This amendment adds a sentence to insure that
evidence, such as documents, is not rendered inadmissible merely because it is presented
in the course of compromise negotiations if the evidence is otherwise discoverable. A party
should not be able to immunize from admissibility documents otherwise discoverable
merely by offering them in a compromise negotiation.").
102 412 F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Minn. 1976); see also EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin. Corp., 558
F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that the purpose of Rule 408 is "to foster open
discussions and out-of-court settlements" (citing FED. R. Evm. 408 advisory committee's
note)).
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more efficient and cost-effective resolution.103 Furthermore, settle-
ment relieves some of the judicial system's caseload burden.104 The
increase in civil and criminal cases in federal district courts, from
89,091 in 1960 to 127,280 in 1970, indeed suggests that there was a
need to reduce the federal caseload. 05 Thus, the federal courts' gloss
on the Advisory Committee's note indicates that there are at least two
reasons why promoting settlements is a "more consistently impressive
ground" than relevance: (1) settlements create more efficient and
cost-effective resolutions for the parties involved, and (2) settlements
conserve judicial resources.
2. The Scope of the Public Policy Rationale
The Advisory Committee's note is also unclear as to how Rule 408
should promote compromise and settlement of disputes. 06 One pos-
sible interpretation of the public policy rationale is that courts should
exclude settlement evidence so that parties will more willingly enter
into compromise negotiations. Under this interpretation, promoting
settlements involves, in part, "pushing" parties to enter compromise
negotiations. This interpretation would suggest that Rule 408's pro-
tection extends beyond formal negotiations.
Another possible interpretation of the public policy rationale is
that courts should promote the settling of disputes once compromise
negotiations begin. The difference between this narrower interpreta-
tion and the first interpretation is that the goal in the narrow interpre-
tation is not to "push" parties into compromise negotiations but
merely to promote an environment in which parties are more likely to
come to an agreement once compromise negotiations have already
begun. Certainly, the first interpretation will also include the goal of
103 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th
Cir. 2003) ("The ability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters a more efficient,
more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial system.").
104 Id. State courts have also developed the same explanation for promoting settle-
ments. The New York Court of Appeals has stated:
A negotiated compromise of a dispute avoids potentially costly, time-con-
suming litigation and preserves scarce judicial resources; courts could not
function if every dispute devolved into a lawsuit. Moreover, there is a socie-
tal benefit in recognizing the autonomy of parties to shape their own solu-
tion to a controversy rather than having one judicially imposed.
Additionally, a settlement produces finality and repose upon which people
can order their affairs.
Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (N.Y. 1993).
105 See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SysTEM 41 (6th ed. 2009).
106 The only reference to settlements in the Advisory Committee's note, other than to
induce a creditor to settle an admittedly due amount for a lesser sum, merely states that "a
more consistently impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the com-
promise and settlement of disputes." FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note (citing
McCORMICK, supra note 13, §§ 76, 251).
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creating an environment in which parties are more likely to come to
an agreement.
The federal courts appear to have taken the narrower interpreta-
tion of the public policy rationale's goals. In Reserve Mining Co., the
District Court of Minnesota explained that the purpose of Rule 408 is
"to encourage free and frank discussion."107 In another case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared that the purpose of
Rule 408 is "to foster open discussions."o10  Furthermore, the Senate
report discussing Rule 408 indicates that Congress intended this nar-
row view of the public policy rationale. The report states: "The excep-
tion for factual admissions was believed by the Advisory Committee to
hamper free communication between parties and thus to constitute
an unjustifiable restraint upon efforts to negotiate settlements ....
The focus on discussions and communication between parties sug-
gests that the scope of the public policy rationale is limited to discus-
sions that occur during compromise negotiations.
3. Begging the Question
Because of the abuse-of-discretion standard of review on appeal
and the lack of written decisions on motions in limine at the trial
level, the precise reasoning supporting the courts' construction of
tests to determine whether there is a dispute is unclear.110 The circuit
courts have largely stated the public policy rationale for Rule 408 and
then declared that the district court's interpretation of "dispute" was
within the spirit of Rule 408.111 Thus, the circuit courts seem to have
justified the district courts' interpretations of Rule 408 by looking at
the scope of the public policy rationale.
However, courts should not look to the public policy rationale to
guide the determination of when a dispute begins because this sort of
reasoning begs the question.112 The public policy rationale aims to
promote "the compromise and settlement of disputes."113 To pro-
mote the compromise and settlement of disputes, courts must at the
outset have a notion of what a dispute is and when one begins. Yet the
107 412 F. Supp. at 712.
108 EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin. Corp., 558 F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing FED. R.
EVID. 408 advisory committee's note).
109 S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057.
110 See supra note 32.
1 11 See, e.g., Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 526-27 (3d Cir.
1995); S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 50 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 1995).
In Big 0, the court merely explained that a review of the record convinced the court that
the trial court "did not commit manifest error" in its ruling. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1373 (10th Cir. 1977).
112 For an explanation of "begging the question," see supra note 96.
113 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (citing McCoRMICK, supra note 13,§§ 76, 251).
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question that the courts are trying to decide is precisely that: when a
dispute begins.
Still, the most worrisome aspect of this problem is not the con-
ceptual gap itself. Rather, the fact that the public policy rationale pro-
vides no guidance for courts to determine when a dispute begins
means that practitioners have no guidance in planning their approach
to settling disputes when they are operating at the fringes of Rule
408-long before litigation has begun. Because of the standard of
review on appeal, the trial courts have much leeway in interpreting
Rule 408's scope.' 1 4 This possibility of varying interpretations of Rule
408's scope undercuts the goals of the public policy rationale because
it requires parties to attempt to negotiate under the narrowest inter-
pretation of Rule 408. Thus, the conceptual gap creates both a prob-
lem for courts interpreting the scope of disputes falling under
Rule 408 and a real-world problem for practitioners in planning their
negotiations.
Furthermore, this conceptual problem bleeds into the real-world
application of Rule 408. When parties to a potential dispute who do
not have a sophisticated understanding of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence attempt to resolve their differences, they most likely do not
consider the future implications of their statements and conduct
under Rule 408. Yet, when a court applies the public policy rationale,
it fashions a rule such that parties to future disputes will be more
likely to negotiate a settlement; the court's decision extends beyond
whether the parties in the present case would have negotiated if they
had known of this rule.115 In this respect, the public policy rationale
directs courts away from resolving the issue with a view toward the
present facts of the case. Instead, courts look to hypothetical future
disputes. Thus, the conceptual problem is not merely confined to the
realm of logic but also presents a challenge to practitioners, courts,
and the unsuspecting layperson.
B. Returning to the Relevancy Rationale
1. A Multifactor Approach
If courts cannot look to the public policy rationale in determin-
ing when a dispute begins under Rule 408, then they should look to
the second rationale: relevancy. Indeed, some courts have already
looked to the relevancy rationale, although not explicitly. The Alpex
114 See Affiliated Mfs., 56 F.3d at 527 ("Because of the applicable standard of review, it
is not entirely clear how the Tenth Circuit would view exclusion, rather than inclusion, of
negotiations made prior to 'the point of threatened litigation.'").
115 In this respect, the public policy rationale is a forward-looking principle. The rele-
vancy rationale, on the other hand, is a backward-looking principle that examines the par-
ticular facts of the case before the court. See infra Part IV.B.
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court's approach represents a bridge between the public policy analy-
sis and the relevancy analysis. In making a Rule 408 determination,
the district court in Alpex "considered factors apart from any indicia of
threatened litigation" and analyzed the circumstances of each docu-
ment and deposition excerpt that the defendant proposed for exclu-
sion. 16 The district court looked at two factors: (1) whether the
communications "took place largely between lawyers," and
(2) whether "the party seeking to exclude the evidence in that case
was guilty of overreaching ... [such] that apply[ing] Rule 408 in that
situation would enable that party to succeed in strongarming an
opponent."'17
The first factor is indicative of relevancy rather than the promo-
tion of settlements. This factor looks at whether the parties had a
sophisticated understanding of the implications of their conduct and
statements. If the communications took place largely between law-
yers, then the parties likely anticipated that a court would exclude the
communications as evidence if the dispute went to trial. The second
factor, however, seems to apply the public policy rationale. If the
party seeking to exclude evidence appears to be abusing Rule 408's
protection, then courts should not allow that party to benefit from the
rule. In this sense, the courts only promote certain kinds of compro-
mise negotiations.
The flaw in the multifactor Alpex approach is that the court none-
theless utilizes the public policy rationale in fashioning its test. Fur-
thermore, there is a tension between the relevancy rationale and the
public policy rationale. The relevancy rationale's implicit goal is
truth; it recognizes that a desire to settle the dispute rather than to
represent the truth may motivate conduct and statements made dur-
ing compromise negotiations." 8 The public policy rationale, on the
other hand, does not aim at the truth. Rather, it represents a kind of
privilege that society recognizes as valuable even if it comes at the cost
of obscuring the truth. In particular, this value is the settlement of
disputes outside of trial to conserve judicial resources and to reach a
more efficient and cost-effective resolution." 9
This truth-versus-privilege aspect creates tension between the rel-
evancy and public policy rationales. Although certain conduct and
statements may be relevant to revealing the truth with respect to a
party's liability or the amount of a claim, the public policy rationale
116 Affiliated Mfrs., 56 F.3d at 527 (quoting Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., Civ. No. 91-2877, slip op. at 5-6 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
117 Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(citing 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 16, § 5306, at 213-14).
118 FED. R EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
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may create a privilege for the conduct or statements. Certainly, noth-
ing inherent in the tension between the truth-versus-privilege aspect
of the two rationales for Rule 408 would require rejecting the mul-
tifactor approach. 120 But because the public policy rationale cannot
inform the determination of when a dispute begins under Rule
408,121 it adds nothing to the determination in balancing the two ra-
tionales in Alpex.
2. Adding to the Multifactor Approach
Even if courts were to adopt the multifactor Alpex approach and
reject the public policy rationale under this approach, the test in Alpex
was very limited, outlining only two factors for courts to look at.'22 To
add to the factors, courts should perhaps examine the parties' intent.
Factors that look to the parties' intent may include the likelihood that
a party will succeed at trial and the party's belief that the dispute will
be properly determined in court. Another factor may be the parties'
sophistication, similar to the first Alpex factor.123 Which particular fac-
tor is to become part of the test should develop over time.' 24
Courts did in fact look at the parties' intent under the common
law protection of offers of compromise. 125 Under the common law
approach,
[t]he true reason for excluding an offer of compromise is that it
does not ordinarily proceed from and imply a specific belief that
the adversary's claim is well founded, but rather a belief that the
further prosecution of that claim, whether well founded or not,
would in any event cause such annoyance as is preferably avoided by
the payment of the sum offered. In short, the offer implies merely a
desire for peace, not a concession of wrong done .... 126
120 Privilege rules in themselves suggest that Congress has taken the stance of favoring
certain kinds of relationships over the ability to present probative evidence. See FED. R.
EVID. 501.
121 My principal argument is that the public policy rationale itself requires a court to
have a preconceived notion of what a dispute is because the public policy rationale's goal is
to promote the settlement of disputes.
122 Alpex, 770 F. Supp. at 165.
123 1&
124 1 do not suggest that these particular factors ought to become part of the mul-
tifactor Alpex approach. Rather, my argument is that, at the very least, courts should create
a more concrete test that will allow attorneys to plan negotiations in anticipation of litiga-
tion. Furthermore, by focusing on the relevancy rationale, courts will have a principled
way to develop their own set of factors.
125 See Bell, supra note 14, at 248-49.
126 4 WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1061(c), at 36 (emphasis omitted). The Advisory
Committee also recognized that settlement offers are not always probative of liability or the
amount of a claim. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note ("The evidence is irrele-
vant, since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any conces-
sion of weakness of position. The validity of this position will vary as the amount of the
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In determining whether a party is motivated by a desire for peace,
some courts have examined the factual situation surrounding the
making of the offer. For example, the plaintiff in Moore v. Stetson Ma-
chine Works claimed that the defendant's car, which the defendant's
agent was negligently driving while within the scope of his employ-
ment, injured the plaintiff.127 The plaintiff offered evidence that the
defendant repaired the plaintiffs car without request, suggesting that
the defendant was at fault for the accident. The court excluded this
evidence because it found that the defendant's motivation for repair-
ing the car was to maintain good public relations.128
The move to a multifactor approach that focuses on the parties'
intent addresses the problems of the current circuit split. First, the
multifactor approach addresses the vagueness of the current tests and
the difficulty that the current tests cause for attorneys in advising their
clients.129 The benefit of a multifactor approach is that attorneys can
position themselves for Rule 408 protection during negotiations with-
out having to explicitly invoke Rule 408 or threaten litigation.130
Rather, a jurisdiction's particular factors would function as formal
steps to trigger Rule 408. Second, this approach avoids the circularity
of using the public policy rationale to answer the threshold question
of when a dispute begins under Rule 408.131 The relevancy rationale,
rather than the public policy rationale, guides the courts in determin-
ing which factors are relevant in determining when a dispute begins.
A final benefit of the multifactor approach is that it allows partic-
ular jurisdictions to determine their own factors for deciding when a
dispute begins under Rule 408. In this regard, the multifactor ap-
proach is easier to implement than completely overhauling how
courts determine when a dispute begins under Rule 408. Courts,
guided by relevancy considerations, can enunciate factors that elabo-
rate on the vague current tests such as "a clear difference of opin-
ion."13 2 One hitch in this approach is that it fails to solve the current
circuit split's fragmentation problem. 33 However, fragmentation is
only a problem because of the vagueness of the tests. A move toward
offer varies in relation to the size of the claim and may also be influenced by other
circumstances.").
127 188 P. 769, 769 (Wash. 1920).
128 Id. at 769-70; Bell, supra note 14, at 245.
129 See, e.g., Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 528 (3d Cir.
1995) (applying "a clear difference of opinion between the parties" test); Big 0 Tire Deal-
ers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1373 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying a
crystallized to the point of threatened litigation" test).
130 Recall that threatening litigation can often frustrate negotiations. See supra text
accompanying note 33.
131 See supra Part IV.A.3.
132 See Affiliated Mfrs., 56 F.3d at 527-28.
133 See supra Part II.
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defining factors that determine when a dispute begins would at least
encourage courts to be more concrete about what they mean.
3. Criticisms of the Relevancy Rationale
Courts had difficulty applying the relevancy rationale under the
common law protection of settlement offers.134 As a result, applying
the relevancy rationale led to a degree of arbitrariness because courts
had to determine the motivation behind a party's communication
before ruling on its admissibility.135 Because of this difficulty, the Ad-
visory Committee shifted the focus away from the relevancy rationale
and toward the public policy rationale with the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. 36
The problem that courts had in applying the relevancy rationale
was that it was often difficult to determine a party's underlying motiva-
tions in offering to compromise.137 A party certainly can have multi-
ple reasons for offering to compromise, and it can be difficult to
pinpoint a principal reason, if any exists.138 For a court to resolve this
ambiguity, it may have to rely on its own experience and knowledge of
why people make settlement offers or examine the factual situation
surrounding the offer.'39 Yet, a judge's own experience and knowl-
edge may not be enough as a party's underlying motivations are not
always clear,140 and an examination of the factual situation surround-
134 See Brazil, supra note 7, at 958; see also Bell, supra note 14, at 242-43 ("It is true that
a desire to obtain peace may be a motivating factor behind offers of settlement, but such a
motive can and often does exist together with other factors which indicate a belief in the
validity of the claim asserted.").
135 See Bell, supra note 14, at 248-49; Brazil, supra note 7, at 958 ("[M]ost courts would
not exclude from evidence admissions of fact that parties made during settlement discus-
sions unless the author explicitly made the statement hypothetical, or incanted the prophy-
lactic words 'without prejudice,' or unless the words constituting the admission were 'so
connected with the offer as to be inseparable from it.'" (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory
committee's note)).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
137 See Bell, supra note 14, at 243-44.
138 See id. at 243 ("Any of the following states of mind may underlie an offer of settle-
ment: (1) a belief that there is no possibility of a successful [prosecution] of the claim, (2)
a belief that the claim is valid up to a certain amount (which amount may be equal to, less
than, or more than the offer of settlement) coupled with an unwillingness to pay more
than the amount offered, (3) a belief that a valid claim exists with only the amount of the
claim in doubt, or (4) a belief that a valid claim may possibly exist accompanied by uncer-
tainty whether or not it could be successfully maintained." (footnote omitted)).
139 See id. at 244.
140 See, e.g., I DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON Evi-
DENCE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 3.4, at 318 (rev. ed. 2002) (recognizing
"the complex set of motivations that might stand behind the decision whether to engage in
[compromise negotiations]"); Bell, supra note 14, at 248-49, 252-53 (criticizing the confu-
sion that the relevancy rationale created under the common law exclusion of settlement
offers).
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ing the offer is only a small shift away from analyzing mental states.141
The factual situation can often be as ambiguous as a party's
motivations.142
However, the difference in the multifactor approach is that it
only applies to the threshold question of whether there is a dispute,
whereas the common law approach that utilized the relevancy ratio-
nale was limited to assessing whether an offer to compromise was mo-
tivated by a desire to resolve the dispute. Although the difference
between the multifactor approach and the common law approach
may seem to be merely a shift in semantics from "offer of compro-
mise" to "dispute," the true difference is that the multifactor approach
is a system by which attorneys can indicate to courts that they are in-
voking Rule 408's protection without threatening litigation. In this
respect, the primary goal of the multifactor approach is not to deter-
mine whether evidence is relevant, as it was under the common law
rule. Rather, the goal of the multifactor approach is to allow parties
to indicate to the court that they wish to protect their negotiations
under Rule 408 without threatening litigation, which would hamper
those negotiations.
The multifactor approach also does not extend to the determina-
tion of what conduct and statements are protected, such as e-mails
and documents that parties use to prepare for a negotiation but never
actually use during the negotiation. I do not suggest a rejection of the
public policy rationale in applying Rule 408 generally; the public pol-
icy rationale still has a place in determining what kinds of conduct
and statements fall within the protection of Rule 408 once negotia-
tions have begun. Even if it is difficult for courts to determine which
factors they should consider, merely establishing concrete factors that
attorneys know about and can use to advise their clients is an incre-
mental step in solving the problem of the current Rule 408, which is
that the ambiguity of the rules creates difficulties for parties in negoti-
ating compromises. Furthermore, courts already assess the evidence's
relevance under Rule 403,143 and they would not be treading into un-
known territory by adopting the multifactor approach. The mul-
tifactor approach simply suggests that courts be forthcoming and
explicit about what they already do.
141 See Bell, supra note 14, at 244-45.
142 See id at 245 (citing Moore v. Stetson Mach. Works, 188 P. 769, 769-70 (Wash.
1920)).
143 See FED. R. EviD. 403 (suggesting that a court should always determine the rele-
vance of the evidence in addition to other possible reasons for exclusion).
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CONCLUSION
The adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 408 has shifted the
rationale for protecting compromise negotiations from excluding ir-
relevant evidence to the public policy of promoting settlements.144
However, the public policy rationale has proven to be problematic in
supporting a test to determine when compromise negotiations begin
such that Rule 408 is triggered. First, the circuit courts have been
cryptic in their reasoning for upholding district courts' decisions to
admit or exclude evidence.s45 Second, the public policy rationale in
fact provides no guidance as to the question of when compromise ne-
gotiations begin, which the courts have merely rephrased as the ques-
tion of when a dispute begins. The public policy rationale itself aims
to promote the settlement of disputes, but the question that courts are
trying to answer is precisely when a dispute begins. Thus, to apply the
public policy rationale to the question of when a dispute begins would
be to engage in a line of circular argument.
Courts should instead look to the relevancy rationale for gui-
dance in determining when compromise negotiations begin. For this,
the courts should utilize a multifactor approach similar to the ap-
proach in Alpex.146 This approach addresses the current tests' vague-
ness and the difficulty that the current tests cause for attorneys in
advising their clients. With this approach, attorneys can position
themselves for Rule 408 protection during negotiations without hav-
ing to explicitly invoke Rule 408 or threaten litigation. Finally, this
approach is a feasible solution that allows particular jurisdictions to
determine their own factors that are relevant to decide when a dispute
begins under Rule 408.
Although the history of the relevancy rationale has suggested that
this approach produces a degree of arbitrariness and is difficult to
apply, this approach would be limited to only determining when a
dispute begins. The irony of the multifactor approach is that by re-
jecting the public policy rationale in analyzing the threshold question
of when a dispute begins and by fashioning a more concrete test,
courts can promote the public policy of encouraging the settlement of
disputes. Although I do not outline the particular factors that courts
should consider, a shift toward a multifactor approach-and away
from the vague tests, such as the "crystallized to the point of
144 See id. R. 408 advisory committee's note ("[A] more consistently impressive ground
is promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes."
(citing MCCORMICK, supra note 13, §§ 76, 251)); Brazil, supra note 7, at 958 ("[T]he Com-
mittee made 'compromise and settlement of disputes' the principal purpose of Federal
Rule of Evidence 408." (quoting FED. R. EvIo. 408 advisory committee's note)).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
146 See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
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threatened litigation" test found in Big 0147-is a modest move in the
right direction to allow attorneys to plan for Rule 408 protection in
their negotiations.
147 Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1373 (10th
Cir. 1977).
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